We provide theory and experimental evidence consistent with an unintended, causal relation between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance and investors' estimates of fundamental value that can be attenuated by investors' explicit assessment of CSR performance. Consistent with ''affect-as-information'' theory from psychology, we find that investors who are exposed to, but do not explicitly assess, CSR performance derive higher fundamental value estimates in response to positive CSR performance, and lower fundamental value estimates in response to negative CSR performance. Explicit assessment of CSR performance, however, significantly diminishes this effect, indicating that the effect among investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance is unintended; i.e., they unintentionally use their affective reactions to CSR performance in estimating fundamental value. Supplemental findings shed light on consequences of these fundamental value estimates: investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance rely on their unintentionally influenced estimates of fundamental value to increase the price they are willing to pay to invest in the stock of a firm with positive CSR performance. Overall, our theory and findings contribute to the CSR and affect literatures in accounting by revealing the contingent nature of how and to 
attributing affect to its source, which here is CSR performance, reduces its unintended influence on subsequent fundamental value estimates, without changing the degree to which affect is experienced. As a result, compared to investors who explicitly assess CSR performance, we expect investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance to derive fundamental value estimates that are more heavily influenced by CSR performance. Further, consistent with this effect being unintended, we expect these investors to have relatively low awareness about the influence of CSR performance on their estimates of fundamental value.
To test our predictions, we conduct an experiment that uses a 2 3 2 þ control design. Graduate business students in a financial statement analysis course take on the role of investors who estimate the fundamental value of a firm. They receive CSR reports that are either relatively positive, relatively negative, or neutral in a control condition. Moreover, participants are either prompted to explicitly assess the firm's CSR performance in addition to conducting traditional financial statement analysis in the Explicit Assessment condition, or are asked to conduct traditional financial analysis without being prompted to explicitly assess CSR performance in the No Explicit Assessment condition.
The experimental results support our predictions. Absent an explicit assessment of CSR performance, investors' estimates of fundamental value significantly increase (decrease) with positive (negative) CSR performance. However, consistent with this effect being unintentional, a prompt to explicitly assess CSR performance significantly diminishes this effect. Further, post-test responses of investors who are not prompted to explicitly assess CSR performance indicate that they have relatively low awareness about the significant influence of CSR performance on their estimates of fundamental value. Taken together, these findings provide theory-driven support for our prediction that explicit assessment of CSR performance significantly moderates the degree to which such performance has an unintended influence on investors' subsequent estimates of fundamental value.
In supplemental analyses, we report evidence that investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance are also willing to pay significantly higher prices to invest in the common stock of a firm with positive CSR performance, and that this effect is fully mediated by their unintentionally influenced estimates of fundamental value. Explicit assessment of positive CSR performance, however, significantly decreases the price they are willing to pay. This overall pattern of findings suggests that the unintentionally influenced fundamental value estimates of investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance have consequences for the bids these investors are likely to make in an equity market.
This study makes several contributions. First, its theory and findings complement the recent archival examinations of the association between CSR performance and proxies of firm value, including Plumlee et al. (2010) , Dhaliwal et al. (2011) , Matsumura et al. (2011) , and Izzo and Magnanelli (2012) . Our study responds to Moser and Martin's (2012, 10) recent call for experimental research to ''address important CSR issues that are difficult to address effectively in archival studies.'' An experiment enables us to hold constant firm characteristics and other factors that influence investors' judgments and decisions in real-world investment settings. In particular, we provide evidence that, absent explicit assessment, there is an unintended, causal relation between CSR performance and investors' estimates of fundamental value.
Second, unlike archival studies, our experimental approach does not rely on market prices to draw inferences about investors' underlying estimates of fundamental value. This is advantageous as both theory and empirical evidence indicate that price and fundamental value can substantially and systematically diverge (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan 1999; Lee 2001; Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002; Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra 2002; Elliott, Krische, and Peecher 2010) . Our experimental approach contributes to the accounting literature by cleanly disentangling the intended from the unintended effects of CSR performance on investors' beliefs about a firm's fundamental value and the price they are willing to pay to invest in the stock of that firm.
Third, in identifying CSR performance as a determinant of investors' affective reactions, we provide a robustness test of prior accounting literature documenting that affective reactions can influence subsequent judgments in accounting contexts. Examples include affective responses to employees' loss of retirement savings influencing jurors' judgments of auditor negligence (Kadous 2001) and affective responses to a supervisor's arrogant personality influencing managers' judgments (Moreno, Kida, and Smith 2002) . Fourth, we provide evidence that explicit assessment of CSR performance has a likely benefit, even for investors who do not plan to use a CSR investment strategy. Specifically, explicit assessment of CSR performance helps investors to form beliefs about firm value that are less susceptible to being influenced by their affective reactions to CSR. Thus, these investors are less likely to make bids in the equity markets that are driven by unintentionally influenced estimates of fundamental value.
Section II next discusses background, while Section III develops our hypothesis. Section IV describes our experiment. Section V discusses the results of our hypothesis test and additional evidence of our underlying theory. Section VI discusses supplemental analyses, and we summarize our study and conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND Demand for and Archival Studies on CSR Performance
There is widespread recognition of investors' growing demand for information about firms' CSR performance, including the development of new integrated reporting frameworks (Eccles and Krzus 2010; Global Reporting Initiative 2011) . Examples include the growth of mutual funds that include only firms with preferred CSR performance characteristics, such as KLD funds, the inclusion of CSR performance measures in annual reports and on firm websites, and the trend toward third-party organizations generating independent CSR ratings and attest reports (Ballou, Casey, Grenier, and Heitger 2012) . 2, 3 Despite the growing demand for CSR disclosures, it is an open empirical question as to whether better CSR performance systematically has positive implications for future financial performance and fundamental value (Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Moser and Martin 2012) .
The corresponding normative question about the conditions under which investors correctly believe that better CSR performance changes a firm's fundamental value is itself a matter of significant debate. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) point out that, although positive CSR performance likely has direct costs, the demand of consumers and other stakeholders for better CSR performance means that positive CSR performance also has benefits for some firms. Although the authors conclude that the costs and benefits of an optimal level of CSR performance are exactly offsetting, a sub-optimal level of CSR performance is likely costly. Empirically, most archival studies provide evidence of a small positive relation between CSR performance and firm value (see Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh [2009] for a review; and also Matsumura et al. [2011] , Dhaliwal et al. [2011] , and Plumlee et al. [2010] ). Recently, however, Izzo and Magnanelli (2012) find that better CSR performance is associated with a higher cost of debt, which they note is consistent with investment in CSR performance tending to be ''a waste of resources'' (Izzo and Magnanelli 2012, 6 ). This finding is consistent with recent conjecture that at least some CSR activities are undertaken ''at the expense of shareholders'' (Moser and Martin 2012, 798) .
Our study complements archival studies by experimentally examining whether an unintended, causal relation exists between CSR performance and investors' estimates of fundamental value. Specifically, while some investors may intentionally infer a link between CSR performance and fundamental value, we also suggest that archival results may be partially driven by the unintended influence of investors' affective reactions to CSR performance.
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT CSR Performance, Affective Responses, and Estimates of Fundamental Value
CSR disclosures likely evoke affective reactions in investors. Specifically, CSR disclosures are often vivid and imagery provoking, which consumer behavior research suggests elicits affective reactions (Keller and Block 1997) . For example, CSR disclosures of sweatshop labor practices or sustainable coffee bean harvesting are likely to create related vivid images in an investor's mind in contrast to the related financial disclosures of wage expense and cost of sales. CSR disclosures about sweatshop labor practices are likely to evoke negative affective reactions, and those related to sustainable coffee bean harvesting are likely to evoke positive affective reactions. In addition, CSR disclosures ostensibly reveal corporate values. When these disclosures indicate that a firm's values are aligned (misaligned or in conflict) with the investors' values about proper firm behavior, we expect a positive (negative) affective reaction.
In the absence of a prompt to attribute affect to its source, ''affect-as-information'' theory predicts that investors will unintentionally use their affective reactions to CSR performance in making subsequent judgments Clore 1983, 2003) . This would impair their ability to react to CSR performance in estimating fundamental value in the way that they intend. Specifically, in our setting, investors will unintentionally interpret the affect generated by the positive or negative valence of the CSR performance as if it were informative about the firm's fundamental value, and it will influence their subsequent financial analysis. Thus we expect, absent a prompt to attribute affect to its source, investors' affective reactions to CSR performance will influence their analysis of the firm such that investors who experience positive (negative) affect will derive a higher (lower) estimate of firm value.
Reducing the Unintended Influence of Affective Reactions on Estimates of Fundamental Value
Affect-as-information theory also indicates that prompting investors to attribute affect to its source reduces its unintended influence on subsequent judgments. Attributing affect to its source is not theorized to change the degree to which affect is experienced, but rather to change how experienced affect is interpreted and used in subsequent judgments. For example, Clore (1983, 2003) find that individuals who are reminded about the state of the weather, which is the source of the affect, no longer use their weather-related affect as an indicator of general life satisfaction, the subsequent judgment. Similarly, Kadous (2001) finds that providing jurors with an instruction effectively discrediting the use of negative affect as an indicator of auditor responsibility reduces the influence of negative outcome information on the jurors' auditor negligence judgments. In our setting, we expect that explicitly assessing CSR performance, as part of an overall investment analysis, will reduce the unintended influence of CSR performance on investors' estimates of fundamental value by prompting investors to attribute their affect to its source. 4 Recent reports indicate that investors use a variety of investment strategies that range from a purely traditional financial statement analysis approach to an approach that prominently features explicit assessment of CSR performance (Social Investment Forum 2009). We abstract from the range of variation in investors' strategies by recognizing that one key distinction among investors is that some explicitly assess CSR performance while others do not. Regardless of whether investors plan to use a CSR-based investment strategy in which they would favor or only invest in socially and environmentally responsible firms, we conjecture that there is a likely benefit of explicit assessment of CSR performance, particularly as investors gain access to more CSR performance information. Specifically, investors who explicitly assess CSR performance are less likely to generate estimates of fundamental value that are unintentionally influenced by their affective reactions to CSR performance.
To summarize, affect-as-information theory predicts that prompting investors to attribute their affect to its source, a firm's CSR performance, will not impact the degree of affect investors experience, but will reduce its unintended influence on subsequent estimates of fundamental value. As a result, compared to investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance, we expect CSR performance to have a smaller effect on the fundamental value estimates of investors who do explicitly assess CSR performance as part of their investment analysis. We formalize our prediction in the following hypothesis, as depicted in Panel A of Hypothesis: When CSR performance is positive (negative), investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance will estimate the firm's fundamental value to be higher (lower), but the influence of CSR performance will diminish with explicit assessment of CSR performance.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD Design
To test our predictions, we conducted an experiment with a full-factorial 2 3 2 þ control, between-subjects design, with CSR performance and explicit assessment of CSR performance as manipulated independent factors. We manipulated CSR performance by varying whether analyst reports depicted positive performance, negative performance, or neutral performance for the control condition. We manipulated explicit assessment of CSR performance by either prompting participants to explicitly evaluate the firm's CSR performance (Explicit Assessment) or not prompting participants (No Explicit Assessment). Panel A depicts the pattern consistent with the hypothesized interaction of corporate social responsibility performance (positive or negative) and an Explicit Assessment of CSR performance (absent or present) on investors' estimates of fundamental value. We depict the Explicit Assessment line to reflect that we have no a priori basis upon which to make a prediction about the intended relation between CSR performance and fundamental value. Panel B depicts the observed pattern of cell means for participants' estimates of fundamental value (see Table 2 , Panel A). This pattern is tested using the ANOVA presented in Panel B of Table 2 .
Participants
Eighty-eight graduate business students enrolled in a financial statement analysis course at a large state university participated in the experiment as proxies for reasonably informed investors. 6 These participants had taken, on average, eight accounting courses and three finance courses. All participants reported that they had used financial statements to evaluate a firm's performance at least once. In addition, 36 percent of participants stated that they had purchased common stock or debt securities, while 86 percent said they planned to do so in the next five years. Participants completed the experiment during a normally scheduled class, with the instructor giving participants extra credit in the course for completing the experiment.
Procedures
Participants received materials in three envelopes, labeled Envelopes 1, 2, and 3, and read and completed the contents of each envelope in sequential order. Envelope 1 included background information about a hypothetical firm and its retail industry. Participants then read two analyst reports, one reporting the firm's social performance and the other reporting the firm's environmental performance. Appendix A reproduces these analyst reports that collectively reflect the CSR performance of the firm.
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The materials then asked Explicit Assessment condition participants to evaluate the firm's CSR performance by responding to five questions about social performance and five similar questions about environmental performance, as shown in Appendix B. Participants in the other conditions observed the same analyst reports but did not explicitly evaluate CSR performance. After reviewing the information in Envelope 1, participants proceeded to Envelope 2, which contained a press release with summary financial statement information for the same hypothetical firm. All participants then evaluated the firm's current financial performance by responding to five questions about the firm's recent financial statements and estimating the fundamental value of the firm's stock.
8 Participants completed the experiment in a computer lab with a computer that displayed a residual earnings valuation template in a spreadsheet.
In deriving an estimate of the fundamental value of the firm's stock, participants were asked to provide the estimates necessary to complete a residual earnings valuation model. Participants provided forecasts of earnings for each of the four subsequent years, a cost of capital estimate, and an estimated residual earnings growth rate after the fourth year (Penman 2009 ). The template then calculated and displayed the resulting estimate of fundamental value, which participants recorded on their pencil-and-paper materials. Appendix C reproduces one participant's completed template. 6 In the analyses in Section V, we exclude one participant who provided an estimate of fundamental value that was more than six times greater than the average of all other participants' responses and more than eight standard deviations greater than the mean. Results are inferentially identical if we include this participant in our analyses. 7 These analyst reports were adapted from Newsweek's 2010-2011 Green Rankings Business Report (Newsweek 2011) . Background and financial information was loosely based on a composite of two retail firms, Kohl's and Ross Stores. We use analyst reports as the disclosure venue as opposed to an unfiltered management disclosure venue to avoid concerns about the credibility and/or reliability of the reported performance measures. In addition, to ensure that our results were not an artifact of the order of the two analyst reports, we counterbalanced presentation order. We do not detect any significant order effect in our analyses. 8 We asked all participants to evaluate current financial performance in order to provide a consistent investment analysis approach for CSR and financial performance for those in the Explicit Assessment conditions. To the extent that the assessment of current financial performance provided a target for participants' affective reactions to CSR performance in the No Explicit Assessment condition, this design choice had the potential to weaken the unintended effect of participants' affective reactions on estimates of fundamental value, thus biasing against our hypothesized result.
Next, to measure willingness to invest in the firm's stock, which we examine in supplemental analyses, participants were asked to assume that they had received an inheritance of $10,000 from a distant relative. They then identified the maximum price per share at which they would be willing to invest 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent of their inheritance in the firm's stock. 9 After completing the materials in Envelope 2, participants proceeded to Envelope 3, which contained manipulation checks and other post-task questions that they completed before leaving the lab.
V. RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
To assess the effectiveness of our manipulation of CSR performance, we asked participants in a post-test questionnaire whether the firm's social performance was ''above the industry average,'' ''about at the industry average,'' or ''below the industry average.'' Ninety-three percent of participants correctly answered this question. Ninety-one percent of participants correctly answered a similar question about the firm's environmental performance.
In addition, to ensure that our positive and negative CSR performance measures elicited affect in our participants, we included post-task questions that asked about the extent to which they were ''happy,'' ''angry,'' ''disappointed,'' and ''pleased'' with the firm's environmental and social performance. 10 To create a single measure of participants' affective reactions to the firm's CSR performance, we perform a factor analysis on responses to these eight questions. All questions load in the expected direction, and a single factor explains 85 percent of the variance in responses (eigenvalue ¼ 6.77). We use this factor as an ''affect score,'' with higher (lower) scores indicating a greater positive (negative) affective reaction. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for this affect score and the eight underlying affect measures.
A comparison of means across conditions reveals that, on average, affect scores for participants in positive CSR performance conditions (mean ¼ 0.97, standard deviation ¼ 0.44) are significantly greater than those of participants in negative CSR performance conditions (mean ¼À1.04, standard deviation ¼ 0.47; t ¼ 17.96, p , 0.01, two-tailed). Further, compared to affect scores when CSR performance is neutral (mean ¼ 0.17, standard deviation ¼ 0.44), participants' affect scores are significantly higher when CSR performance is positive (t ¼ 6.46; p , 0.01, two-tailed), and significantly lower when CSR performance is negative (t ¼ 9.31; p , 0.01, two-tailed).
11 Thus, it appears that our manipulation of CSR performance successfully elicited affect in the expected directions. Further, similar to previous studies examining the use of affect as information (e.g., Kadous 2001), we do not expect our assessment manipulation to alter the degree to which participants experience affect, but rather the way in which affect is interpreted and used in subsequent judgments. As expected, we do not observe a significant CSR performance by assessment interaction for our affect factor (p ¼ 0.32, untabulated). 9 We measure each participant's ''price profile'' as opposed to asking for a single price at which they would be willing to invest in order to better control for participant-specific determinants of willingness-to-pay for firms with positive or negative CSR performance. Specifically, by using a repeated-measures design we are able to reduce participant-specific variation and increase the power of our tests (Stevens 1996; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li 2005) . 10 We purposely elicited these measures as post-task questions instead of eliciting them immediately after presenting CSR performance information. We did so because the affect-as-information theory underlying our hypothesis predicts that calling attention to CSR performance-related affect would reduce its unintended influence on subsequent judgments, which would undermine our Explicit Assessment manipulation by effectively prompting all participants to assess CSR performance. 11 To ensure that our results were not driven by affect toward the firm's financial performance, we used similar questions to elicit participants' affective reactions to the firm's financial performance. Tests of these measures reveal no significant differences between any of our experimental conditions (all p-values . 0.10).
Finally, because of the active nature of our assessment manipulation, we did not ask a specific manipulation check question; however, all Explicit Assessment condition participants except one responded to questions eliciting evaluations of the firm's CSR performance. Results reported below are inferentially identical if we classify the one participant who failed to respond to these questions as a No Explicit Assessment condition participant. To ensure that our positive and negative CSR performance measures elicited affect in our participants, we included posttask questions that asked about the extent to which they were ''happy,'' ''angry,'' ''disappointed,'' and ''pleased'' with the firm's environmental and social performance. To create a single measure (the ''affect score'' in Panel A) of participants' affective reactions to the firm's CSR performance, we perform a factor analysis on responses to these eight questions.
Test of Our Hypothesis
We hypothesize that when CSR performance is positive (negative), investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance will unintentionally estimate a firm's fundamental value to be higher (lower), but that explicit assessment of CSR performance will diminish this unintended influence on investors' fundamental value estimates. Descriptive statistics for participants' fundamental value estimates across our four treatment conditions and the neutral control condition are tabulated in Panel A of Table 2 . To test our hypothesis, we first compare No Explicit Assessment condition investors' estimates of fundamental value when CSR performance is positive, neutral control, and negative. This comparison tests whether, absent explicit assessment, CSR performance has the expected influence on investors' fundamental value estimates. (Welch 1947 (Welch , 1951 . On an unadjusted basis, the simple effect of CSR performance given no Explicit Assessment is significant at p ¼ 0.01, one-tailed (F 1,30 ¼ 5.46), and the simple effect of Explicit Assessment given positive CSR performance is significant at p ¼ 0.04, one-tailed (F 1,31 ¼ 3.37). Participants estimated fundamental value by providing the following inputs to a residual earnings model template: earnings forecasts for four subsequent years, cost of capital, and a long-term growth rate for residual earnings. Figure 1 , Panel B provides an illustration of these results.
Establishing this influence sets the stage for testing whether explicit assessment diminishes the influence of CSR performance.
An untabulated one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals significant differences in fundamental value estimates across positive, neutral, and negative CSR performance conditions (F 2, 49 ¼ 4.65, p ¼ 0.01). Pairwise comparisons show that estimates in the No Explicit Assessment, positive CSR condition are significantly higher than those in the neutral CSR condition ($25.92 . $20.72; p ¼ 0.04, one-tailed), while those in the No Explicit Assessment, negative CSR condition are marginally significantly lower ($19.14 , $20.72; p ¼ 0.09, one-tailed). Consistent with the simple main effect implied by our hypothesis, positive (negative) CSR performance significantly increases (decreases) investors' estimates of fundamental value absent an explicit assessment.
Next, as tabulated in Panel B of Table 2 , we use a two-way ANOVA to test the predicted interaction across our treatment conditions. Consistent with our hypothesis, results reveal a significant CSR Performance 3 Explicit Assessment interaction (p ¼ 0.02, one-tailed). This result is presented graphically in Panel B of Figure 1 . 12 In further support of our hypothesized interaction, the negative versus positive CSR performance factor explains 15.4 percent of the variation in No Explicit Assessment condition investors' estimates of fundamental value, but only 0.1 percent of the same variation for Explicit Assessment condition investors.
13,14 Also consistent with affect-asinformation theory, investors' affect scores are significantly correlated with estimates of fundamental value in the No Explicit Assessment conditions (r ¼ 0.32; p ¼ 0.07, two-tailed), but not in the Explicit Assessment conditions (r ¼ À0.10; p ¼ 0.55, two-tailed).
For completeness, simple effects tests in Panel C of Table 2 show that participants who do not explicitly assess CSR performance estimate fundamental value to be an average of 24.5 percent higher (9.4 percent lower) than those who do explicitly assess CSR performance when CSR performance is positive (negative). This difference is statistically significant when CSR performance is positive ($25.92 . $20.82; p ¼ 0.05, one-tailed) and directionally consistent but not significant at conventional levels when CSR performance is negative ($19.14 , $21.12; p ¼ 0.12, one-tailed). 15 Further, the average fundamental value estimates of participants who do not 12 The standard deviation of fundamental value estimates in the No Explicit Assessment/positive CSR condition is 10.80, compared to a standard deviation of 4.00 for responses in the other conditions. Although standard parametric ANOVA is quite robust to violations of homoscedasticity (Hays 1994) , we repeat our analysis using ranked responses as an additional robustness test (for similar approaches, see Kachelmeier and Messier 1990; Hirst, Jackson, and Koonce 2003) . Results are inferentially identical using this nonparametric approach: most importantly, the CSR performance 3 Explicit Assessment interaction remains significant (F ¼ 4.75, p ¼ 0.02, one-tailed). 13 Because investors' general political attitudes and attitudes about social and environmental issues might influence their reactions to CSR performance, we measured these attitudes with post-task questions. Results indicate responses to each of the questions range across the entire seven-point scale, suggesting a wide range of attitudes. In addition, all have a median response of 0 (the midpoint of the scale) and a mean response that does not differ significantly from 0, suggesting that attitudes do not tend toward the extremes. As expected with random assignment of participants to experimental conditions, responses to these measures do not differ significantly across conditions (all p-values . 0.10). Further, reported results are inferentially identical when we include these measures as covariates in our analyses. 14 Additional, untabulated analyses suggest that it is predominantly differences in the numerator, estimates of future earnings, not the denominator, estimates of discount rates, in the residual earnings model that drive differences in participants' estimates of fundamental value. Specifically, an ANOVA reveals both a significant main effect of CSR performance (all p-values , 0.05, one-tailed) and a marginally significant CSR Performance 3 Explicit Assessment interaction (all p-values , 0.07, one-tailed) for earnings forecasts in all four years. 15 The weaker simple effect in the negative as compared to the positive condition could be at least partially explained by the result that affect scores differ significantly by Explicit Assessment condition when CSR performance is negative (À1.18 , À0.88, t ¼ 1.91; p ¼ 0.07, two-tailed), but not when it is positive (0.93 ' 1.01, t ¼ 0.51; p ¼ 0.62, two-tailed). Thus, in the negative condition, investors have to overcome marginally stronger negative affective reactions to CSR performance to derive fundamental value estimates that are not influenced by this affect.
explicitly assess CSR performance are 35.4 percent higher when CSR performance is positive than when it is negative ($25.92 . $19.14; p ¼ 0.02, one-tailed), while the À1.4 percent difference among Explicit Assessment condition investors' estimates of fundamental value does not differ significantly across positive and negative levels of CSR performance ($20.82 ' $21.12; p ¼ 0.85, two-tailed) . Taken together, these results support our hypothesis, albeit with stronger support evident when CSR performance is positive. When CSR performance is positive, investors develop significantly higher estimates of fundamental value when they do not explicitly assess compared to when they do explicitly assess CSR performance. The result that explicit assessment of CSR performance diminishes the relation between CSR performance and investors' estimates of fundamental value is consistent with affect-as-information theory and provides evidence that the influence of CSR performance on fundamental value when investors do not explicitly assess CSR performance is unintended. Nevertheless, we next provide corroborative evidence of our theory that the effect is unintended by examining investors' awareness of the influence of CSR performance on their estimates of fundamental value.
Additional Support for Our Theory: Investor Awareness
Our theory and hypothesis suggest that, in the absence of explicit assessment of CSR performance, the effect of CSR performance on investors' estimates of fundamental value is unintended, which would prevent investors from reacting to CSR performance in the direction and/ or with the magnitude that they believe to be best. As such, theory would also predict that investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance have relatively low awareness about how CSR performance is significantly and directionally influencing their estimates of fundamental value.
To provide corroborating evidence of this low level of awareness, we use a similar approach to that in Weitz and Wright (1979) by asking investors to retrospectively report how much the CSR performance dimensions affected their fundamental value estimates. Specifically, we asked all participants to evaluate the extent to which the firm's environmental and social performance explained their judgmental inputs into the residual earnings model used to generate estimates of fundamental value. For example, we asked, ''To what extent did XYZ's environmental performance explain your estimate of XYZ's cost of capital?'' Participants responded on seven-point Likert scales with endpoints 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Completely), and a midpoint of 4 (Moderately). We asked similar questions about the extent to which environmental and social performance explained estimates of future earnings and the long-term growth rate in residual earnings. We average these responses to develop an ''awareness score. '' 16 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for this awareness score and the six underlying awareness measures. A higher awareness score indicates stronger investor perceptions that CSR performance consciously influenced their estimates of fundamental value.
To examine the degree to which No Explicit Assessment participants believed the firm's CSR performance influenced their estimates of fundamental value, we compare their responses to the six questions described above to the midpoint of 4 (Moderately) on the scale. The responses of participants who do not explicitly assess CSR performance (averaged across positive and negative CSR performance conditions) are significantly lower than the midpoint on average and for each of the six questions individually with a mean of 2.62 and a range from 2.32 to 2.77 (all p-values , 0.01, two-tailed). So while No Explicit Assessment participants perceive that CSR performance has less than a moderate influence on their judgments (but greater than no influence at all, which would correspond to a rating of 1 on our scale), these participants' fundamental value estimates are statistically significantly influenced by CSR performance. Specifically, their fundamental value estimates are 34.5 percent higher when CSR performance is positive instead of negative. Thus, their awareness score results corroborate our main findings, and are consistent with our theory with respect to No Explicit Assessment participants.
For completeness, we also compare the awareness scores of investors who do explicitly assess CSR performance to the midpoint of the scale. Their awareness scores also are significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale with a mean of 3.35 and a range from 3.29 to 3.40 (all p-values , Participants were asked to evaluate the extent to which the firm's social and environmental performance explained their inputs into the residual earnings model used to generate estimates of fundamental value. For example, we asked, ''To what extent did XYZ's environmental performance explain your estimate of XYZ's cost of capital?'' Participants responded on seven-point Likert scales with endpoints 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Completely), with the midpoint of each scale labeled 4 (Moderately). We asked similar questions about the extent to which environmental and social responsibility performance explained estimates of future earnings and the long-term growth rate in residual earnings. We average these responses to develop the ''awareness score'' tabulated in Panel A.
0.05, two-tailed), which reconciles reasonably with a lack of an ''on average'' significant simple effect of CSR performance on these investors' fundamental value estimates. Finally, we compare the awareness scores of investors who do and do not explicitly assess CSR performance, and find that awareness scores are significantly lower in the No Explicit Assessment conditions than in the Explicit Assessment conditions (2.62 , 3.35; p ¼ 0.04, two-tailed). Thus, although CSR performance actually has a greater directional influence on investors' fundamental value estimates in the No Explicit Assessment conditions than in the Explicit Assessment conditions, investors in the No Explicit Assessment conditions believe that CSR performance has a significantly smaller influence on their estimates of fundamental value. This is again consistent with investors in the No Explicit Assessment conditions having relatively low awareness about the sizable, directional influence of CSR performance on their estimates of fundamental value.
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In sum, investors' awareness scores provide additional evidence that investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance have a relatively low level of awareness about the significant influence of CSR performance on their fundamental value estimates. The awareness scores, combined with results from our hypothesis, provide corroborating evidence of theory and suggest an unintended, causal relation between CSR performance and investors' fundamental value estimates.
VI. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: INVESTORS' WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY
We have thus far reported findings that support our hypothesis that investors' estimates of fundamental value are unintentionally influenced by their affective reactions to CSR performance unless they explicitly assess CSR performance. These findings are stronger for positive CSR performance than for negative CSR performance. In our supplemental analysis, we focus on whether the stronger effect of positive CSR performance on investors' estimates of fundamental value has practical implications in the sense of significantly influencing investors' willingness-to-pay for a company's common stock. In a CSR context, an investor's willingness-to-pay for a firm with positive CSR performance may very well be driven by their estimates of fundamental value, but could also be driven by an inherent preference for firms with positive CSR performance or even how they believe others may value a firm with positive CSR performance. For example, prior research suggests that investors' affective reactions (to, e.g., CSR performance) can influence the maximum price they will pay for a firm's stock, independent of their beliefs about fundamental value (Aspara and Tikkanen 2010) . In addition, documenting whether pricing effects are evident serves as both a test of the practical consequence of, and a robustness check on, our primary analyses.
A post-test portion of our case materials elicited investors' willingness-to-pay by presenting them with the following: ''Assume that you have received an inheritance of $10,000 from a distant relative. Please indicate the maximum price per share at which you would be willing to invest the following amounts in XYZ stock.'' To better control for participant-specific variation in prices, we elicited four prices per participant instead of one, asking for the maximum price they would pay to allocate ''$10,000, or 100 percent, of your inheritance,'' ''$7,500, or 75 percent, of your inheritance,'' ''$5,000 or 50 percent of your inheritance,'' and ''$2,500 or 25 percent of your inheritance'' to Firm XYZ's common stock. This approach also reduces measurement error caused by forcing participants to use a single price when how much they would pay quite likely decreases as they allocate larger shares of their inherited wealth to a single firm's share of stock. This repeated-measures approach enables us to remove participant-specific, systematic variation from the error term of our models, thereby increasing the effective power of our tests without biasing our alpha levels (e.g., Stevens 1996; Kutner et al. 2005) . Using these prices, we create a Percentage of Inheritance Invested price profile for each participant and estimate a repeated-measures ANOVA that also includes a between-subjects factor for our experimental conditions that we call CSR Performance/Assessment. The resulting mixed design enables us to test whether CSR performance influences the price investors are willing to pay in the absence of explicitly assessing CSR performance.
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Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for participants' willingness-to-pay prices in the positive, neutral, and negative CSR performance conditions. Panel B presents the repeated-measures ANOVA for positive CSR performance, which tests the difference in willingness-to-pay profiles across the No Explicit Assessment/Positive CSR, Explicit Assessment/Positive CSR, and neutral (i.e., control) conditions. Figure 2 separately plots investors' price profiles for each of these three conditions.
The price profiles are upward sloping, indicating that investors quite reasonably would pay more per share to invest smaller portions of their inheritance in one firm's stock. This effect corresponds to the Percentage of Inheritance Invested within-subjects effect in the ANOVA presented in Panel B of Table 4 ( F 3, 141 ¼ 87.67; p , 0.01) . The effect of greater relevance for our theory, however, is the Percentage of Inheritance Invested 3 CSR Performance/Assessment interaction (F 6,141 ¼ 2.25; p ¼ 0.04). This interaction obtains because positive CSR performance causes investors' price profiles to be significantly steeper in the absence of Explicit Assessment, reflecting the increasingly larger price differentials across assessment conditions going from higher to lower percentages of inheritance invested (i.e., $0.54 at 100 percent, $1.88 at 75 percent, $2.29 at 50 percent, and $3.43 at 25 percent). This is exactly as we would expect if findings in support of our hypothesis have implications for the prices investors are willing to pay.
19
Panel C of Table 4 presents the repeated-measures ANOVA for negative CSR performance. As with positive CSR performance, we observe increasing prices as percentage of inheritance increases (F 3,150 ¼ 55.57; p , 0.01) . However, although directionally consistent, we do not observe a significant Percentage of Inheritance Invested 3 CSR Performance/Assessment interaction (F 6,150 ¼ 0.60; p ¼ 0.73) , consistent with the weaker effects of negative CSR performance on fundamental value estimates of investors in No Explicit Assessment conditions.
In addition, collapsing across positive and negative CSR performance, investors' affect scores are significantly correlated with these willingness-to-pay prices for No Explicit Assessment 18 For our supplemental analysis, we exclude two additional participants: one participant whose willingness-to-pay response was nearly eighty times greater than the average of all other responses and more than eight standard deviations greater than the mean response, and another participant who did not respond to our willingness-to-pay measures. 19 To confirm that the increased willingness-to-pay of investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance is driven, at least in part, by their unintentionally influenced estimates of fundamental value, we apply the regression approach to mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) . We find that investors' fundamental value estimates fully mediate the influence of positive CSR performance on the maximum price investors report being willing to pay. Specifically, when added as a covariate in our repeated measures model of investors' willingnessto-pay, investors' estimates of fundamental value are significant both on a between-subjects basis (F 1, 46 ¼ 39.39; p , 0.01) and on a within-subjects basis (F 3, 138 Together, our primary and supplemental findings suggest that investors' affective reactions to CSR performance can unintentionally influence investors' estimates of fundamental value, and that these unintentionally influenced estimates explain the bids they are willing to make for a firm's common stock when CSR performance is positive. They also suggest, however, that investors who explicitly assess CSR performance are less susceptible to forming beliefs about firm value that are unintentionally influenced by these affective reactions and, in turn, are less susceptible to making bids for a firm's stock that reflect this unintentional influence.
VII. CONCLUSION
We present theory and experimental-empirical evidence suggesting that investors' estimates of fundamental value depend jointly on a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and on explicit assessment of such performance during their investment analysis. Overall, our results are consistent with investors unintentionally using their affective reactions to CSR performance to derive estimates of fundamental value, and with Explicit Assessment of CSR performance significantly diminishing this unintended influence.
Supplemental analyses also suggest that the unintentionally influenced fundamental value estimates of investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance have consequences for the price they are willing to pay to invest in a firm's common stock. Specifically, investors who do not explicitly assess CSR performance are also more willing to invest in a firm with positive CSR performance.
Our theory and findings extend recent archival examinations of the association between CSR performance and firm value by providing evidence of a causal relation between CSR performance and investors' estimates of fundamental value that reflects an unintended influence of CSR. Our study also provides evidence of the robustness of affect's role in subconsciously influencing judgments in accounting settings. While prior work examines juror and employee judgments in contexts unlikely to affect the participants' own wealth (e.g., Kadous 2001; Moreno et al. 2002) , our study confirms affect's unintended influence and substantial effect size in a context highly relevant to participants' wealth-fundamental value estimation. Finally, by separately eliciting beliefs about firm value and investors' willingness-to-pay for a firm's stock, we show that positive Participants were asked to imagine that they had inherited $10,000 from a distant relative and to report the maximum prices at which they would invest 100 percent, 75 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent of their inheritance in Firm XYZ's common stock. These percentages are the within-subjects factor in the repeated measures ANOVAs in Panels B and C. The between-subjects factor in Panel B (Panel C) examines three levels: positive (negative) CSR performance with no explicit assessment of CSR performance, positive (negative) CSR performance but with explicit assessment of CSR performance, and neutral CSR performance with no explicit assessment of CSR performance (i.e., control condition). This design enables us to examine directly not only whether more positive CSR performance increases the price investors are willing to pay, but also whether explicit assessment of more positive CSR performance mitigates any such increase. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the results for positive CSR performance.
CSR performance causally increases investors' willingness-to-pay via their own unintentionally influenced fundamental value estimates. If widely sustained across investors, then this ironically could decrease the firm's empirical cost-of-equity capital. In this respect, our study complements prior archival research that documents an association between enhanced CSR performance/ disclosure and cost of capital at the market level (e.g., Plumlee et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) .
Our study also suggests several opportunities for future research. For example, it is possible that in addition to reducing the unintended, affect-driven effect of CSR performance on fundamental value estimates, explicitly assessing CSR performance also improves investors' awareness of the effect of CSR performance on their estimates of fundamental value. Improved awareness and, in turn, better self-insight, would be particularly helpful to investors because there
FIGURE 2 Effect of Positive CSR Performance on Investors' Willingness to Invest Inheritance
A post-test question asked investors to assume they had inherited $10,000 and to specify maximum prices at which they would invest 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of their inheritance in Firm XYZ's stock (x-axis). The y-axis is willingness-to-invest prices (in $). See Table 4 for additional descriptive and inferential statistics. The result suggests that positive CSR performance increases investors willingness to invest their inheritance in Firm XYZ stock unless investors explicitly assess CSR performance.
are different normative perspectives and mixed archival evidence about the conditions under which better CSR performance increases, does not change, or decreases firms' fundamental value (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Margolis et al. 2009; Matsumura et al. 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Plumlee et al. 2010; Izzo and Magnanelli 2012; Moser and Martin 2012) . Therefore, it is important that investors are able to separate their beliefs about firm value from their preference for that firm's CSR performance.
Further, while we investigate the unintended effect of CSR performance on the judgments of relatively financially savvy graduate business students (as proxies for nonprofessional investors), future research could consider the effect of CSR performance on customers and other stakeholders. Also, future research may profitably examine alternative CSR assessment methods as well as potential costs or other benefits of explicit assessment of CSR performance. More specifically, future research could examine whether explicit assessment of CSR performance has the same effect for investors and/or other stakeholders who hold extreme views about CSR and, thus, may have affective reactions to CSR performance that differ from the graduate business student in our study. Finally, our results regarding both estimates of fundamental value and willingness-to-pay are driven primarily by the effects in the positive CSR performance condition. While we did not anticipate the weak effects in the negative CSR performance condition, as noted earlier, they may be a consequence of the stronger negative affective reaction to negative CSR performance. Nevertheless, because there is limited support for our primary prediction and the related theoretical arguments in the negative CSR performance condition, future research could be valuable in offering additional insight as to whether our results will generally hold only for cases of positive CSR performance, or are likely to hold for both cases of positive and negative CSR performance.
In sum, our study demonstrates how, without explicit assessment, investors' affective reactions to CSR performance can unintentionally influence their estimates of fundamental value and, in turn, influence how much investors are willing to pay for the firm's stock. Overall, the theory-consistent findings herein provide new reason to harken back to Paul Slovic's opening quotation in his 1972 thought piece about how psychology theories of human judgment can be applied to help us better understand investment decision making, quoting from Adam Smith's The Money Game: ''You are-face it-a bunch of emotions, prejudices, and twitches, and this is all very well as long as you know it . . . If you don't know who you are, this is an expensive place to find out'' (Slovic 1972, 779) .
